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Abstract  
Purpose- To examine the determinants of the volume of environmental disclosures and their 
quality, with particular focus on the role of audit committees and the effects of the Smith 
Report recommendations for the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Design/methodology/approach – Quantitative large sample analysis of UK FTSE350 
companies for the period 2007-2011.  
Findings – Firms with higher quality audit committees make higher quality disclosures. 
Larger firms with block shareholders have greater volume of disclosures, whilst audit 
committee quality does not increase disclosure volume. 
Research limitations/implications – Findings are based on evidence from single country and 
imply further international comparative research. 
Practical implications - Audit committees mitigate the requirement for prescriptive legislation 
on narrative accounting disclosures relating to environmental issues. 
Originality/value – Contributes to research that has examined the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms, specifically audit committees, and the quality of financial 
reporting by considering voluntary narrative disclosures on environmental matters.  
 
Keywords:  Audit Committees, Financial Reporting Social and Environmental Disclosure, 
Voluntary disclosure narrative.  
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1. Introduction 
Financial reporting quality has received increased attention following scandals in the US and 
Europe (DeZoort et al., 2002). To address the issue of quality discussion has focused on 
corporate governance mechanisms. As a post-Enron development, audit committees, for the 
UK at least, represent a governance innovation that might promote financial reporting quality. 
Effective corporate governance in turn means a series of mechanisms which ensure effective 
resource use, financial performance and social accountability and responsibility (Tricker, 2000; 
Cadbury, 2000). These emphases are suggestive of a relationship between corporate 
governance and social and environmental disclosures as manifestations of financial reporting 
quality, and that an effective audit committee will promote that relationship. Using 
environmental reporting as a specific case of social disclosures, the paper examines this 
relationship empirically. 
Evidence from prior studies suggests effective audit committee oversight plays a key 
role in corporate governance (Smith Report, 2003) and improves financial reporting quality 
(Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008; Beasley et al., 2009). Improvements are achieved through 
strengthening governance, promoting conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) and 
reducing opportunistic earnings management (Xie et al., 2003; Bédard et al., 2004; Leventis 
and Dimitropoulos, 2012). Audit committees are also associated with error reduction and 
regulatory compliance (Barako et al., 2006), oversight of risk management and internal control 
systems (Chambers and Weight, 2008) and the extent of voluntary disclosure (Ho and Wong, 
2001).  
On the basis of this research, UK regulation, based on the Smith Report (2003), and 
now assimilated into the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council 
Guidance on Audit Committees), appears well founded. The Smith review (Para. 1.5) stressed 
the audit committee’s importance. It specified desirable audit committee features, whilst 
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allowing some discretion as to their adoption. Its recommended  that there should be at least 
three independent non-executive directors, with at least one member having significant, recent 
and relevant financial experience and that  there should be no fewer than three meetings during 
the year, According to the Code, firms are required to comply or explain non-compliance 
(Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2013), and firms may go beyond minimum requirements. Rules 
concerning audit committee scrutinization of disclosures and related information, including 
risk management processes, are set out in only general terms of clarity and completeness (FRC, 
2012, p.7; KPMG, 2013: p.1).  
Social, environmental and reputational risks should be viewed as potentially important 
elements of risk assessment in a company (Friedman and Miles, 2006; KPMG, 2010). As 
argued by Clarke (2007), “…corporate social and environmental responsibility appears to be 
becoming established in many corporations as a critical element of strategic direction, …, as 
well as an essential component of risk management” (p.268). It follows that audit committees 
oversight includes narrative disclosures, including social and environmental disclosures in the 
general case and, as confirmed by KPMG (2013; 2014) is a matter of discussion for a 
substantial proportion of audit committees, providing assurance for such disclosures in UK 
listed companies (Jones and Solomon, 2010).  
It is therefore useful to examine the relationship between audit committee effectiveness 
and the quality and extent of narrative disclosures, specifically those relating to environmental 
matters. Such an investigation assists the above market orientated, investor-focused literature, 
because environmental disclosures are associated with relatively high managerial discretion, 
providing the opportunity to assess the  incremental contribution of audit committees where 
their role is not substantially proscribed by regulation, an area where there has been only limited 
research (Rainsbury et al., 2009), for example the effect of audit committee quality on the 
content of voluntary forward-looking statements (Wang and Hussainey, 2013). Consideration 
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of environmental disclosures also helps regulators appreciate the effects of current provisions 
on environmental responsibility, either because it obviates the necessity for further specific 
regulation, or if such regulation is needed, assists in determining its character. Some evidence 
is available from research in emerging markets which has so far examined the effect of the 
presence of audit committees, along with other governance mechanisms, on the volume of 
social and environmental accounting disclosures, suggesting a positive relation (Khan et al., 
2013; Said et al., 2009).  
The paper develops this research by examining the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and the volume and quality of environmental disclosures for UK 
firms. The relationship might be expected to be positive insofar as investors have difficulty 
evaluating the effect of voluntary un-audited disclosures in terms of future earnings (Rajgopal 
et al., 2003). Audit reduces information asymmetry (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and uncertainty, 
and provides increased assurance (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). The paper also contributes 
to research that has examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
environmental disclosure (Gibson and O’Donovan, 2007).  
The paper uses data from the period 2007-2011, thereby providing a window to test the 
Smith Report’s recommendations for audit committees following the issue of the UK Code. 
Specifically, its purpose is to answer the question, do audit committee characteristics increase 
the volume and quality of environmental disclosures?  The next section reviews the literature 
and develops hypotheses to answer the research questions. The third section sets out sample 
data and model. A fourth section reviews the empirical results. The final section draws 
conclusions.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Prior research, based on legitimacy (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; 
Khan et al., 2013) and stakeholder theories (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; Gyöngyi, 2008;  Van 
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Der Laan et al., 2008), derived from political economy theory, has enhanced our understanding 
of corporate social responsibility accounting, and these approaches can be complemented by 
positivist methods, whether routine or more nuanced (Gray and Laughlin, 2012, p.238). Many 
similarities exist between stakeholder and legitimacy theories and, therefore, should not be 
treated as separate theories but two overlapping perspectives which can explain why a company 
might choose to make particular set of voluntary disclosures. 
More specifically, companies may respond to stakeholders’ expectations by integrating 
disclosures into their corporate strategies to reflect ‘real commitment’ or alternatively they just 
do the minimum to maintain certain levels of legitimacy, which may include tactical or 
symbolic legitimacy (Dawkins and Fraas, 2011). Companies with increased vulnerability due 
to their size or industry disclose more information voluntarily as means to managing 
legitimacy, for example companies operating in industries with high environmental footprint 
such as oil and gas, and mining adopt substantive environmental actions where environmental 
legitimacy can be achieved by increasing environmental disclosures (Kuo and Chen, 2013). 
Since audit committee quality can also vary within a particular industry or company size, and 
to reflect the incremental influence of audit committee on disclosure content, the paper uses a 
positivist approach to establish whether audit committees quality increases the volume and 
quality of disclosures.  
Compliance with Smith (2003) is achieved where all committee members are 
independent non-executive directors, there are three or more meetings per year, there is at least 
one committee member with financial expertise and the committee size is greater than three 
(FRC, 2010). Several studies have specifically examined the effects of individual aspects of 
these audit committee characteristics on financial reporting quality. For example, Mangena and 
Pike (2005) show that audit committee expertise promotes financial disclosure and that expert 
capability promotes earnings quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2010), where such expertise in the face 
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of increasingly complex information (Abbott et al., 2004; Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 
2004) assures the quality of financial reporting (Chen et al., 2006), and enhances the quality 
and credibility of information provided to the market (Smith, 2003).  Pomeroy and Thornton 
(2008) in a meta-analysis of 27 studies show that audit committee independence is the most 
commonly chosen measure of audit committee quality and that the consensus shows that it 
increases financial reporting quality. Another strand of research has noted the positive effects 
of audit committees’ diligence, measured by frequency of meetings (for a summary see 
DeZoort et al., 2002).  
In addition to expertise, independence and diligence are potential indicators of audit 
committee quality. Prior research has suggested that the interactions of these variables are 
likely to reflect more strongly than their separate components (Black et al., 2006; Zaman et al., 
2011). For this reason, our study, tests the effects of audit committee characteristics using 
composite measures of audit committee quality, supported by sensitivity tests of the effects of 
individual components, on financial reporting quality.  
When studied in relation to audit committee effectiveness, financial reporting quality 
has been measured using a disparate range of variables. These have typically considered 
discretionary accruals and generally found a positive relationship (Pomeroy and Thornton, 
2008). However, none of the studies listed by Pomeroy and Thornton (2008, pp.310-311, table 
1) have considered the extent or quality of accounting disclosure. Of other studies that do 
measure disclosure, Mangena and Pike (2005) use an index of financial and non-financial 
disclosures in interim financial reports and indices measuring the volume of social and 
environmental disclosures (Khan et al., 2013; Said et al., 2009). For example, Said et al. (2009) 
find a positive association between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
audit committees and social and environmental disclosure in Malaysia. Using evidence from 
Bangladesh, Khan et al. (2013, pp. 208-213) identify a positive relationship between the 
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presence of an audit committee and social and environmental disclosures, whilst noting that 
pending legislative proposals include provisions similar to Smith recommendations. To 
construct volume-based measures, these studies rely on disclosure index methodologies using 
checklists for dichotomous variables (Cooke and Wallace, 1990; Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).  In summary, the research shows that individual aspects of audit 
committee quality promote social and environmental disclosure measured by volume-based 
indices. 
Survey and anecdotal evidence suggests good reasons to link audit committees with the 
quality of environmental disclosures. KPMG conducts the international survey of corporate 
responsibility reporting every three years. There has been an important shift with CSR 
reporting becoming a standard practice instead of an exception where more companies disclose 
information relating to specific CSR objectives and strategies (KPMG, 2008). Recent surveys 
(KPMG, 2013, 2014) show that audit committees’ scrutiny is widespread. For example, 47% 
of audit committee members, representing the highest percentage of respondents in 2014 (49% 
in 2013 survey) believe that economic, political and social risks are among the most important 
(aside from financial reporting risk) which justified agenda time to discuss these challenges. 
The above surveys indicate that audit committees should be involved with corporate social 
responsibility initiatives and their impacts on society and community. However, because the 
degree of involvement varies, research that examines the effects of these variations on the 
quality of environmental disclosures across a large sample of firms should be able to quantify 
the differential effects of audit committee quality. The utility of such an examination is 
compounded by recent suggestions that the audit function requires extending to include social 
and environmental issues, strengthened through changes to corporate governance and company 
legislation (Perry, 2006; Dassen, 2011; Singh, 2013). As Moffat (2010) suggests, the increasing 
importance of the sustainability agenda has created new approaches to governance in relation 
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to risk management and oversight which includes companies like PepsiCo ‘applying formal 
governance and auditing processes to environmental programs and systems’ (p.22). High 
profile events, such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, 
and its damaging consequences, attributable in part to governance failures (De Villiers et al., 
2011), have led individual companies like BP to strengthen procedures (Windsor and 
McNicholas, 2012) and specify the role of the audit committee for the purposes of preventing 
future disasters.  BP now confirms assurance of its health and safety and environmental reports 
and its audit committee report states: “The work of the audit committee in 2013 has been 
focused on three key themes. Firstly, financial reporting and accounting judgments, particularly 
with respect to assessing BP’s financial responsibilities arising from the Deepwater Horizon 
accident. Secondly, reviews of key group-level risks and BP’s system of controls and risk 
management. Thirdly, regular reports which assist the committee in maintaining assurance over 
the management of financial risk and in overseeing the performance of the external auditor. 
These have been supplemented by private meetings of the committee with key constituents, 
including our group audit function, the group ethics and compliance officer and lead external 
audit partners” (BP plc., 2014).. Shell’s internal audit result, which operates a business control 
incident reporting procedure, is reported to the Audit Committee (Perry, 2006).  
Other examples indicate audit committees are concerned with environmental 
disclosures besides the effects of an immediate ‘shock’.  These include British American 
Tobacco’s Audit Committee, which reviews the effectiveness of the business risk systems of 
the Company including recommendations of the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee 
process and receiving and reviewing reports from it (British American Tobacco, 2014); The 
Imperial Tobacco Group reports environmental data to allow for data verification. With the 
assistance of the Audit Committee, the Group’s Board reviews its risk management processes 
to allow for the efficient use of the Group’s resources and for social, sustainability, 
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environmental issues (Imperial Tobacco Group plc., 2013); The NCC Group Plc’s Board takes 
into account social and environmental issues in its discussions and decision-making and the 
audit committee monitors the Company’s environmental policy procedures (NCC Group, 
2014). 
To examine this apparent relationship further, the quality of disclosures is also 
evaluated. Prior research using disclosure quality has measured their comprehensiveness based 
on benchmarks of best practice (Hooks and Van Staden, 2011) or degree of specificity (García-
Meca and Martínez, 2005; Tooley and Guthrie, 2007), or the extent of comparability, utilizing 
standardized measures (Marshall and Brown, 2003), composite indices (Rupley et al., 2012), 
or a balanced scorecard based framework (Wei et al., 2008). Beck et al. (2010) develop a 
method that incorporates these features. Referred to as the consolidated narrative interrogation 
instrument (CONI), it offers dual qualitative and volumetric measures. Qualitative measures 
are developed using a hierarchical typology related to level of detail, quantification, 
specification and comparability. It is therefore particularly suited to present purposes of 
investigating audit committee quality impact on the quality and quantity of environmental 
disclosures, using the following hypotheses: 
H1a. The quantity of environmental accounting disclosure is positively related to the quality of 
the audit committee.  
H1b. The quality of environmental accounting disclosure is positively related to the quality of 
the audit committee. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Data and variables 
The sample includes all firms continuously listed in the UK FTSE350 in the period 2007 to 
2011 and consists of 772 observations after elimination of firms with missing data. 
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Environmental responsibility disclosures and corporate governance variables were hand 
collected from Annual Reports. Data for financial variables were collected from DataStream. 
Environmental disclosure data were collected applying the CONI  research instrument to 
environmental disclosures of the sample. CONI applies a matrix instrument of environmental 
disclosure categories which increases validity by decreasing the likelihood of double coding 
(Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 2010). Cross coder reliability tests resulted in an alpha value 
of 87.8% (Krippendorff, 1980). The CONI approach consists of three steps (Beck et al. 
2010): Step 1- coding content diversity: analysing the narrative of firms’ annual reports at the 
level of phrase or clause. Step 2 - coding content quality based on five types. Step 3 - 
volumetric measurement: number of disclosure items per category using phrase counts. The 
five types of disclosure in Step 2 provide an indicator of quality of disclosure: Type 1 - a pure 
narrative disclosure such as issues related to categorical definition. Type 2 - a pure narrative 
disclosure with more details related to disclosure in each category. Type 3 - quantitative 
disclosure by category. Type 4 - quantitative and qualitative disclosure of the categories. 
Type 5 - quantitative, qualitative and comparable disclosure. Examples of the coding process, 
including a definition and an example sentence from an annual report are provided in 
appendix 1. Using this approach, the number of disclosure sentences (VOLDISC) measures 
the total number of environmental clauses disclosed each firm’s annual report. The quality of 
the firm’s disclosures (QUALDISC) is allocated according step 2 in the CONI approach, 
using the firm’s highest scoring sentence to generate a 0-5 scale, where 0 = no disclosure and 
5 = highest possible quality of disclosure..  
The typology provides a similar, incremental hierarchical method of classifying the 
quality of disclosures to that used by Toms (2002), where disclosure of quantitative information 
is of higher quality than mere narrative because it either cannot be replicated without actual 
investment at a similar level or can only be claimed through deliberate misstatement.  
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Audit committee quality is measured in a composite fashion. Smith compliance is 
indicated where all committee members are independent non-executive directors, there are 
three or more meetings per year, there is at least one committee member with financial expertise 
and the committee size is greater than three. Since the substantial majority of firms are Smith 
compliant, this reduces the variable’s statistical variation. Moreover, compliance is strongly 
correlated with firm size, making it difficult to unpick the quantitative impact of audit 
committee characteristics from pure scale factors. For these reasons, an additional variable is 
used, ACSCORE, measured by a score for each audit committee criterion (i.e. number of audit 
committee meetings (ACMEET); number of audit committee members (ACSIZE); percentage 
of audit committee members who are independent- non executive (ACIND); percentage of 
audit committee members with financial expertise (ACEXP). For each criterion a score of 2 is 
awarded for exceeding Smith requirements, 1 for Smith compliance and 0 for less than 
compliance.  For example, if ACMEET >3, score 2; if ACMEET= 3, score 1, if ACMEET< 3, 
score 0; and so on for other audit committee individual characteristics, summed to create 
ACSCORE. In addition to these measures, the individual audit committee characteristics were 
also used to examine their individual contributions.  
Board size, measured by the total number of directors, is included as a variable 
reflecting the role and effectiveness of the board. Prior literature argues that board size leads 
to greater attention to corporate social responsibility activities (Halme and Huse, 1997). A 
larger board is more likely to be diverse and include directors with different skills, experience, 
knowledge and background related to social and environmental responsibility issues (De 
Villiers, et al., 2011). 
Prior literature (see, for example, Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Jenkins and 
Yakovleva, 2006) indicated the potential importance of further variables that could be added 
as controls. Big 4 involvement and external auditing of environmental disclosure were 
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excluded [1]. Substantial ownership, measured by the presence of block-holders controlling 
more than 5% of shares, was included because they have strong incentive to monitor managers’ 
behaviour (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), which could be associated with additional voluntarily 
social and environmental disclosures (Halme and Huse, 1997; Eng and Mak, 2003).  
Larger firms with greater resources have opportunities to increase the scale and scope 
of their environmental activities and to disclose them. Firm size (SIZEt-1) is measured by 
natural log of lagged total assets; firm resources are represented by profitability measured by 
lagged return on equity (ROEt-1), and lagged cash flow from operations (CFOt-1). Assumed 
causality is that larger firms with cash and other resources disclose more information of higher 
quality. Lagging SIZE, ROE and CFO underpins the assumed relationship and mitigates 
endogeneity issues that tend to confound the analysis of the link between financial performance 
and higher disclosure (Ullmann, 1985). Financial leverage (LEV) is also controlled in line with 
prior studies (e.g. Cormier and Magnan, 1999; Naser et al., 2006) which find a positive 
association between leverage and CSR disclosures, arising from increased dependency on 
capital markets and/or perception of risk.  
A discretionary accrual estimate is incorporated as a further control variable. Firms 
associated with better quality disclosure tend to have higher accruals quality and vice versa 
(Mouselli et al., 2012; Lobo and Zhou, 2001). Companies with dual and multiple cross listing 
can be under scrutiny from foreign investors and other stakeholders therefore pressure for 
disclosure will also increase (Hackston and Milne, 1996). The final control variable use the 
DataStream Industry Classification Benchmark Level 1 industries, to create ten groups that 
reflect the differing exposure of firms to environmental issues  
3.2 Model tested 
To test H1a and H1b, our empirical model is set out below. 
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ENDISC = β0 + β1ACQUAL + β2BODSIZE + β3SUBOWN + β4SIZEt-1 + β5ROEt-1 + β6LEV + 
β7DACCi,t + β8CFOt-1 + β9CROSSLIST + β10IND + ε          (1) 
where: 
ENDISC Environmental disclosure aggregate score, using two measures. First, 
QUALDISC is the highest recorded level achieved in step 2 of the CONI 
typology. Second, VOLDISC is the total disclosures according to step 3 of the 
CONI approach. 
ACQUAL Smith compliant audit committee (AC) composite quality measure based on the 
following components: ACSIZE number of audit committee members; 
ACMEET number of audit committee meetings; ACIND percentage of audit 
committee members who are independent non-executive directors; ACEXP 
percentage of audit committee members with financial expertise. ACQUAL = 
1, if ACSIZE ≥ 3; ACMEET ≥ 3, ACIND = 100%; ACEXPs ≥ 1. Therefore 
ACQUAL = 1 if Smith compliant; 0 otherwise.  
ACSCORE is the sum of the scores for each audit committee criterion: ACSIZE; ACMEET; 
ACIND; ACEXP. For each criterion a score of 2 is applied if Smith 
requirements are exceeded; 1 for compliance and 0 for non-compliance.   
BODSIZE  number of board members.  
SUBOWN the total percentage of shares held by substantial shareholders (5% or more).  
SIZEt-1 natural log of total assets in the prior year  
ROEt-1  return on equity in the prior year  
LEV total debt to total assets ratio,  
DACCi,t           absolute discretionary accruals as defined below. 
CFOt-1             net cash flow from operating activities in the prior year  
CROSSLIST a dummy variable takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm is listed on more than one 
stock exchange and ‘0’ otherwise   
IND           industry dummy variable. 
 
The modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) is employed to estimate discretionary 
accruals (DACCi,t) as a proxy for accrual quality (Mouselli et al., 2012, pp.39-40). 
Discretionary accruals are estimated by obtaining total current accruals (TCA) for firm i in year 
t as follows: 
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TCAi,t = (ΔCAi,t - ΔCASHi,t) - (ΔCLi,t - Δ STDEBTi,t)     (2) 
where: 
ΔCA    change in current assets 
ΔCash  change in cash and cash equivalent  
ΔCL  change in current liabilities  
ΔSTDEBT change in short-term debt 
 
A cross-sectional model for all sample firms in each industry sector for which at least ten 
observations were available in year t is used to estimate the following:  
TCAi,t / Tai,t -1 = α1 (1 / TAi,t -1) + α2 [(ΔREVi,t / TAi,t -1] + εi,t    (3) 
where: 
 TAi,t -1  the lagged value of firm i's total assets 
ΔREVi,t  change in annual revenue of firm i in year t from period t-1  
 
Using the industry- and year-specific estimates of α1 and α2, where for each sample firm the 
non-discretionary accruals (NDACi,t) and absolute discretionary accruals (DACCi,t) are 
computed as:  
NDACi,t = ά1 (1/TAi,t -1) + ά2 [(ΔREVi,t - ΔRECi,t ) / TAi,t -1]    (4) 
DACCi,t = [(TCAi,t / TAi,t -1) - NDACi,t]                  (5) 
 
where: 
ΔRECi,t change in receivables of firm i in year t from period t-1.      
Other variables are as defined above. 
 
4. Results and analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Tables 1-3. In Table 1, mean and distributional 
characteristics are reported for each variable. Of the continuous variables, ROEt-1 demonstrated 
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significant non-normality as a function of outlying observations, which were dealt with by 
Winsorisation (see, for example, Artiach et al., 2010). The data in Tables 3-5 are reported after 
Winsorisation at the 1% level, applied to ROEt-1 and all continuous variables. 
It is noteworthy that the mean for ACQUAL is 0.83, which is higher than the equivalent 
figure of 0.16 applied to a sample of UK FTSE350 companies between 2001-2004 inclusive 
(Zaman et al., 2011), demonstrating the changes brought by the Smith Report (2003) 
recommendations. Since ACQUAL composite measure shows that 83% of our sample meets 
all four hurdles of audit quality, we refine this variable to enrich its content, using the 
alternative ACSCORE measure. The mean value for ACSCORE is 5.817 with minimum value 
of 1 and maximum value of 8.  
[Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 reports mean values of key variables by industry. The Oil and Gas industry 
tends to disclose the most by volume and quality of environmental disclosure and financial 
services the least. These industries contrast the relative sensitivity of activities towards the 
environment. In general, industries disclosing high volume tend to also make high quality 
environmental disclosures, although not in all cases. Utilities firms, for example, have high 
volume disclosures but not correspondingly high quality. Conversely, telecommunications 
have high quality, but low volume disclosures. Although the industry classifications do not 
overlap precisely, relative sector positions differ from those reported in the latest KPMG survey, 
which show utilities to be the fourth best sector, ahead of oil and gas. Financial services also 
outperform oil and gas in the KPMG survey (KPMG, 2013, p.16).  
 
[Table 2 here] 
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Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for all the variables in the models. As the Table 
illustrates, there is high degree of cross-correlation between key variables, including SIZE, 
BODSIZE and audit committee quality measures, suggesting that care is required when 
constructing regression models to capture their individual and joint effects.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
4.2 Empirical tests of disclosure determinants  
Results of tests of disclosure determinants are shown in Table 4 (Panel A, B and C). Models 
(1.1), (1.3), (1.5), (1.7), (1.9), and (1.11) use VOLDISC as the dependent variable, a count 
measure with negative binomial specification. Models (1.2), (1.4), (1.6) (1.8), (1.10), and (1.12) 
use QUALDISC, a 0-5 ascending scale variable, employing an ordered-Probit specification. 
All tests use random effects with robust standard errors. Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM tests 
confirm this as the correct specification. Durbin Wu-Hausman tests confirm the absence of 
residual endogeneity.  Models (1.1) and (1.2) test the impact of audit committee composite 
measure of Smith compliance (ACQUAL) on the quality and quantity of disclosure. Models 
(1.3) and (1.4) test individual impacts of audit committee characteristics (ACSIZE, ACMEET, 
ACIND, ACEXP) along with board size (BODSIZE) and control variables. Finally models (1.5) 
and (1.6) add accrual quality (DACC) with remaining variables.  
Tests in Model (1.1) show that ACQUAL increases the volume of disclosure, although 
the significance is marginal. There is therefore only weak support for hypothesis 1a. In Model 
(1.2), ACQUAL has a positive and significant effect on the quality of disclosure, suggesting 
strong support for hypothesis 1b.   BODSIZE is insignificant and remained so when models 
were re-tested excluding correlated variables, ACQUAL, SIZEt-1, and ROEt-1. An interaction 
variable combining ACQUAL and BODSIZE was insignificant in all models, including further 
16 
 
tests using a binary measure of BODSIZE with a median split, suggesting the absence of 
complementary effects [2]. These results suggest that Smith compliant audit committees, but 
not large boards, increase disclosure volume and significantly increase the quality of 
disclosures.  
Models (1.3) and (1.4) test the impact of individual audit committee components. Their 
general lack of significance may be explained by their time-invariant features.  The exception 
is ACEXP, which significantly increases the quality of disclosure. Returning to hypothesis 1b, 
the quality of environmental accounting disclosure seems better explained by the Smith 
components in combination, rather than their separate effects, although of the individual 
components accounting expertise is the most important.   
Models (1.5) and (1.6) incorporate the accruals quality variable (DACCi,). The results 
show that lower discretionary accruals enhance the quality and volume of disclosures. This is 
consistent with Francis et al. (2005) and Mouselli et al. (2012) and confirms that when there 
accruals quality is higher  information quality is higher, and managers disclose more 
information (Lobo and Zhou, 2001). 
SIZEt-1 is significant in all models and SUBOWN is significant in models where 
VOLDISC is the dependent variable, suggesting that ownership blocks promote the volume 
but not quality of disclosures. Table 3 shows that SIZEt-1 is negatively correlated with 
SUBOWN, suggesting that firms with influential block holders are typically smaller. In models 
where SUBOWN is insignificant (i.e. where QUALDISC is the dependent variable), the results 
stand when SIZEt-1 variable is dropped. CROSSLIST has a positive and significant impact on 
the quality and volume of disclosure. The results also indicate that profit, cash flow and 
leverage had no effect on the quality and volume of disclosure. Table 3 reveals that ROEt-1 is 
negatively correlated with SIZEt-1 and SUBOWN.  LEV and CFOt-1 were insignificant in all 
models. 
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Although tests using the ACQUAL variable offer support for hypothesis 1b, problems 
with this variable indicated the need for further sensitivity tests. As the results in Table 1 show, 
83% of firms are Smith compliant, and this has the consequence of reducing the information 
content of the ACQUAL variable. Panel B in Table 4 extends the tests by substituting 
ACSCORE for ACQUAL to pick up a greater range of audit quality effects. In general the 
ACSCORE variable was insignificant. Nonetheless, sensitivity tests showed that it was 
significant as a determinant of QUALDISC in the absence of SIZE. Tests including an 
interaction variable between SIZEt-1 and ACSCORE variables (ACSCORE*SIZE) (Models 1.9 
and 1.10) were also insignificant. However, since our models are not linear, we cannot simply 
interpret interaction terms using t-statistics (Norton et al., 2004).  Instead, an investigation of 
the marginal effects is required with the factor variable calculation adjusted to reflect that 
ACSCORE and SIZE are not independent of each other. We analyse the marginal effects of 
ACSCORE on the probability of making high quality/low quality disclosures for the sample 
grouped into deciles according to SIZE. The marginal effects of ACSCORE on the probability 
of making higher quality disclosures are greater for lower size decile firms (Figure 1). 
Conversely, the marginal effects of ACSCORE on the probability of making lower quality 
disclosures are greater for higher size decile firms (Figure 2). In other words, audit committee 
quality increases the probability of high quality disclosures and reduces the probability of low 
quality disclosures for smaller firms. To test this result further, in Table 4, Panel C restricts the 
sample to small firms only to examine the impact of audit committee scores on disclosure 
volume and quality disclosures. Results show that the ACSCORE variable has a significant 
impact on the volume and quality of disclosure and that Smith compliance and indeed going 
beyond it, leads to an improvement in disclosure not explained by size alone. The finding is 
important because it confirms the joint significance of size and audit committee variables, 
whereas prior studies only offer tentative evidence of their separate significance. For example, 
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Khan et al. (2013, pp.216-218) report significant cross correlation between firm size and the 
presence of an audit committee, but do not explore the interaction effects, notwithstanding the 
substantial reduction in model significance arising from the addition of the audit committee 
variable [Table 5, models 1 and 7, p.218]. Similarly, Said et al. (2009) report size and audit 
committee variables in their model but do not consider their interaction, although size is 
significant in the absence of the audit committee variable and insignificant in its presence 
(Table 8, p.222). The small firm sample also shows that LEV and CFO, which were 
insignificant in the full models, have a positive impact on the volume and quality of disclosure 
respectively. CROSSLIST remains positive and significant in both samples. The results of 
examining the impact of leverage on CSR disclosures are mixed and the direction of the 
relationship is still unclear as evidenced in prior literature (Naser et al., 2006; Wallace et al., 
1994). 
[Table 4 here] 
[Figures 1 and 2 here] 
5. Conclusions 
The results from the above tests suggest broad support for the two hypotheses. The evidence 
more strongly supports H1b than H1a, suggesting audit committee quality tends to increase 
quality rather than volume of environmental accounting disclosures. The Smith report 
provisions therefore improve environmental disclosure quality. Of the separate provisions, only 
the requirement for accounting expertise causes significant improvement. Where firms go 
beyond Smith, there are further improvements in quality, and these benefits are greater for 
smaller firms. In comparison to audit committees, the role of the board, in terms of its size at 
least, has less of an impact on environment disclosure. Nonetheless, larger firms have greater 
volume and quality of disclosure, as do firms with lower discretionary accruals. Firms with 
block shareholders tend to have greater volumes of environmental disclosures, although neither 
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factor impacts on disclosure quality. Leverage and prior year cash flow promote higher volume 
and quality of disclosure respectively, but only for smaller firms in a limited number of 
industries. Oil and gas firms tend to make the highest volume of and highest quality disclosures 
and financial services the least, reflecting the differing environmental sensitivity of these 
industry groupings.  
These results are underpinned by detailed testing of model specification and sensitivity 
analysis, including detailed tests to deal with a problem likely to affect similar studies: the 
confounding effects of firm size. Even so there are some important limitations. The sample was 
restricted to mostly large UK firms with Big 4 auditors, such that the quality of audit firms and 
the effects of external audit of environmental disclosures could not be evaluated. Both are 
potentially important and could be the subject of further research. The study was only 
concerned with environmental disclosures within companies’ annual reports and could be 
extended to include other categories of disclosure, including social, employee and other 
stakeholder disclosures or indeed narrative disclosures intended to benefit investor decision-
making. It could also examine the impact of audit committees on the stand-alone/ 
supplementary environmental disclosures. A further limitation is the exclusively UK focus of 
the research. Further research on the relationship in international contexts could be useful, 
particularly the USA, where disclosure requirements are more demanding, including detailed 
information about audit committees.  
Notwithstanding the limitations, the results are of interest to accounting researchers and 
regulators. Environmental disclosures are mostly voluntary and market-driven and their 
analysis provides insight into the determinants of such disclosures and the effect of audit 
committees on disclosure behaviour. Where there has been regulation, for example the 
codification of the Smith report in UK corporate governance practices, the impact on disclosure 
quality has been positive. The potential effect of audit committees in this respect suggests that 
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regulation aimed at improving corporate governance processes is also likely to increase the 
quality of disclosure and improve wider accountability of firms for the environmental 
consequences of their actions. Also, there is less pressure to specify mandatory environmental 
disclosure requirements. As environmental issues become more commercially and politically 
significant, there will be a corresponding increase in the scope and value of the audit committee.   
 
Notes 
1. Fewer than 5% of the firms in the sample subjected environmental disclosures to external audit 
and almost all sample firms had big 4 auditors. The Department of Trade and Industry and 
Financial Reporting Council (2006)’s report found similar concentration, reporting that the Big 
4 represented around 97% of audit fees paid by UK listed companies in 2004. Variables 
representing Big 4 involvement and external audit of environmental disclosures were therefore 
excluded from the study. 
2. Detailed results of this model are otherwise similar and not separately reported in Table 4. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression variables 
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QUALDISC = qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 types in CONI; VOLDISC = total environmental phrases per coded category 
using CONI method; ACQUAL = 1 [if all audit committee members are independent non-executive directors and ACMEET =>3, and ACEXP 
=>1, and ACSIZE =>3], otherwise=0; ACSCORE = scoring system based on a count for each audit committee criterion; ACMEET = number 
of AC meetings; ACSIZE = number of AC members; ACIND = % of audit committee members who are independent- non executive; ACEXP 
= % of audit committee members with financial expertise; BODSIZE = number of members on board; SUBOWN = total percentage of 
substantial shareholding who own 5% or more; SIZEt-1 = natural log of total asset; ROEt-1 = return on equity in the prior year; LEV = debt to 
asset ratio; DACCi,t = absolute discretionary accruals for firm i in year t; CFOt-1 = natural log of cash flow from operations in the prior year; 
CROSSLIST = a dummy variable takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm is listed on more than one stock exchanges  and ‘0’ otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
QUALDISC 3.167 4.000 1.567 0.000 5.000 -0.524 1.784 
VOLDISC 41.30 35.00 34.13 0.000 206.0 1.563 6.017 
ACQUAL 0.834 1.000 0.372 0.000 1.000 -1.797 4.230 
ACSCORE 5.817 6.000 1.494 1.000 8.000 -0.352 2.442 
ACSIZE 3.771 4.000 0.913 2.000 7.000 0.864 3.545 
ACMEET 4.339 4.000 1.652 1.000 17.00 2.556 13.88 
ACIND 0.931 1.000 0.198 0.000 1.000 -3.144 12.26 
ACEXP 0.374 0.333 0.215 0.000 1.000 1.372 4.833 
BODSIZE 9.572 9.000 2.484 4.000 18.00 0.697 3.274 
SUBOWN 0.242 0.199 0.188 0.000 0.956 1.193 4.665 
SIZEt-1 14.68 14.69 2.405 7.850 20.81 -2.909 20.71 
ROEt-1 0.240 0.173 0.437 -0.440 3.551 5.215 37.97 
LEV 0.256 0.240 0.181 0.000 1.131 0.629 3.457 
DACCi,t 0.083 0.026 1.027 0.00004 28.53 27.53 762.5 
CFOt-1 10.98 12.10 5.489 -14.690 18.13 -3.236 13.11 
CROSSLIST 0.973 1.000 0.161 0.000 1.000 -5.897 35.777 
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TABLE 2 
Variable mean values by industry 
 
 
 
Health Care, Telecommunications, Utilities and Financials are dropped from the full sample when including DACC i,t, as the number of observations in these industry sectors was less than ten. 
 
Variable definitions as table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable No obs QUALDISC VOLDISC ACQUAL BODSIZE SUBOWN SIZEt-1 ROEt-1 LEV BETA DACCi,t CFOt-1 CROSSLIST 
              
Oil and Gas 32 3.656 70.06 0.968 11.406 0.234 15.952 0.233 0.138 0.839 0.037 12.778 0.181 
Basic Materials  41 3.097 49.07 0.805 9.902 0.271 14.281 0.191 0.237 1.098 0.044 11.659 0.148 
Industrials  174 3.373 50.78 0.804 8.902 0.216 14.236 0.242 0.234 0.804 0.037 11.365 0.146 
Consumer Goods 97 3.041 39.05 0.917 9.268 0.246 14.583 0.322 0.256 0.804 0.091 9.161 0.154 
Health Care 21 3.190 34.67 0.857 10.428 0.157 15.443 0.251 0.272 0.441 - 13.379 0.165 
Consumer Services  220 3.277 37.47 0.782 9.4 0.284 14.582 0.329 0.307 0.697 0.033 11.807 0.142 
Telecommunications 29 3.586 41.21 0.552 10.517 0.232 15.036 0.214 0.243 0.454 - 9.878 0.149 
Utilities  29 3.276 53.83 0.965 9.862 0.179 16.067 0.195 0.233 0.451 - 13.362 0.119 
Financials  102 2.431 17.18 0.922 10.588 0.226 15.050 0.130 0.221 0.882 - 7.556 0.155 
Technology  27 3.111 40.55 0.852 7.888 0.328 13.651 0.477 0.085 0.897 0.032 11.441 0.128 
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  TABLE 3 
Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
Variable definitions as table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables QUALDISC VOLDISC ACQUAL ACSCORE BODSIZE SUBOWN SIZE ROE LEV DACC CFO CROSSLIST 
QUALDISC 1.000            
VOLDISC 0.583*** 1.000           
ACQUAL 0.127*** 0.063* 1.000          
ACSCORE 0.053 -0.008 0.333 1.000         
BODSIZE 0.082** 0.041 0.138*** 0.478*** 1.000        
SUBOWN -0.045 0.036 -0.050 -0.168** -0.198** 1.000       
SIZEt-1 0.149*** 0.009 0.156*** 0.415*** 0.591*** -0.295*** 1.000      
ROEt-1 0.020 0.094*** -0.006 -0.043 -0.082** -0.109*** -0.128*** 1.000     
LEV 0.048 0.072* -0.052 -0.035 0.042 -0.034 0.065* -0.025 1.000    
DACC -0.121*** -0.063* -0.016 -0.077** -0.119*** 0.062* -0.149*** 0.073* -0.016 1.000   
CFOt-1 0.229*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.309*** 0.109*** -0.312*** 0.323*** 0.042 0.031 -0.168*** 1.000  
CROSSLIST 0.158*** 0.116*** 0.038 -0.048 0.016 0.011 -0.015 0.036 0.004 -0.07** -0.004 1.000 
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TABLE 4 
Disclosure determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
 VOLDISC QUALDISC VOLDISC QUALDISC VOLDISC QUALDISC 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Variable  (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) 
ACQUAL 0.134* 
(1.93) 
0.395*** 
(3.02) 
  0.126* 
(1.69) 
0.369** 
(2.36) 
ACSIZE   -0.014 
(-0.41) 
-0.058 
(-0.70) 
  
ACMEET   -0.001 
(-0.06) 
0.021 
(0.59) 
  
ACIND   -0.127 
(-1.09) 
0.017 
(0.13) 
  
ACEXP   0.108 
(0.82) 
0.157** 
(2.20) 
  
BODSIZE 0.005 
(0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
0.011 
(0.80) 
-0.006 
(-0.22) 
-0.021 
(-1.26) 
-0.078* 
(-2.05) 
SUBOWN 0.308** 
(2.20) 
0.165 
(0.59) 
0.310*** 
(2.18) 
0.099 
(0.35) 
0.185* 
(1.02) 
0.088 
(0.22) 
SIZEt-1 0.028** 
(1.90) 
0.115*** 
(3.86) 
0.044** 
(2.46) 
0.122*** 
(3.91) 
0.034** 
(1.92) 
0.312*** 
(3.96) 
ROEt-1 0.010 
(0.19) 
-0.041 
(-0.38) 
0.014 
(0.26) 
-0.038 
(-0.36) 
0.014 
(0.27) 
0.051 
(0.42) 
LEV 0.298 
(1.60) 
0.393 
(1.10) 
0.205 
(1.07) 
0.365 
(1.0) 
0.094 
(0.44) 
-0.297 
(-0.59) 
DACCi,t     -1.042** 
(-2.08) 
-2.613*** 
(-2.18) 
CFOt-1 -0.002 
(-0.38) 
0.010 
(1.05) 
-0.002 
(-0.38) 
0.011 
(1.09) 
-0.003 
(-0.55) 
0.008 
(0.59) 
CROSSLIST 0.524** 
(2.45) 
1.248*** 
(3.50) 
0.562** 
(2.59) 
1.318*** 
(3.58) 
0.931*** 
(3.15) 
1.104*** 
(3.83) 
IND DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.920*** 
(2.90) 
1.408** 
(2.48) 
-0.372 
(-1.07) 
0.362*** 
(6.48) 
-0.088 
(-0.18) 
2.465** 
(2.25) 
Prob Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 755 755 755 755 561 561 
Hausman Test 40.13  22.9  3.95  
Durbin-Wu 0.725 0.314 0.963 0.961 1.383 1.111 
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Models (6.1), (6.3), (6.5), (6.7), (6.9), and (6.11) are tested using negative binomial while Models (6.2), (6.4), (6.6), (6.8), (6.10), and (6.12) are tested using ordered-Probit specifications.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Numbers between brackets are t statistics. 
 
Variable definitions as table 1 
Panel B  Panel C 
Robustness Check with Audit Committee Scores for the Full Sample  Audit Committee Scores Impact for Small Firms 
 VOLDISC QUALDISC VOLDISC QUALDISC  VOLDISC QUALDISC 
 Coef. 
 
Coef. 
 
Coef. Coef.  Coef. 
 
Coef. 
 
Variable (1.7) (1.8) (1.9) (1.10)  (1.11) (1.12) 
ACSCORE 0.021 
(1.09) 
0.035 
(0.95) 
-0.103 
(-0.88) 
-0.042 
(-0.21) 
 0.003** 
(2.30) 
0.011*** 
(3.15) 
ACSCORE* SIZE   0.008 
(1.08) 
0.005 
(0.39) 
   
BODSIZE 0.003 
(0.24) 
-0.010 
(-0.38) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
-0.010 
(-0.42) 
 -0.019 
(-0.97) 
-0.062 
(-1.24) 
SUBOWN 0.295** 
(2.10) 
0.143 
(0.51) 
0.294** 
(2.10) 
0.146 
(0.52) 
 0.334** 
(1.02) 
0.502 
(1.02) 
SIZEt-1 0.027* 
(2.22) 
0.113*** 
(3.71) 
-0.021 
(-0.46) 
0.083 
(1.02) 
  
 
 
ROEt-1 0.006 
(0.12) 
-0.038 
(-0.36) 
0.006 
(0.11) 
-0.038 
(-0.35) 
 0.025 
(0.43) 
-0.094 
(-0.69) 
LEV 0.293 
(1.57) 
0.369 
(1.03) 
0.316* 
(1.68) 
0.380 
(1.05) 
 0.541** 
(2.42) 
0.981* 
(1.83) 
DACC 
 
-0.003 
(-0.11) 
0.014 
(0.36) 
-0.002 
(0.08) 
0.017 
(0.42) 
 -0.032 
(-1.07) 
0.022 
(0.41) 
CFOt-1 -0.002 
(-0.32) 
0.012 
(1.17) 
-0.001 
(-0.32) 
0.011 
(1.18) 
 0.007* 
(1.08) 
0.027** 
(2.11) 
CROSSLIST 0.553** 
(2.59) 
1.283** 
(2.23) 
0.565*** 
(2.65) 
1.308*** 
(2.90) 
 1.211*** 
(3.50) 
1.169*** 
(3.44) 
IND DUMMIES Included Included Included Included    
Constant -0.918*** 
(-2.85) 
1.283** 
(2.23) 
-0.255 
(-0.38) 
0.871 
(0.73) 
 -0.899** 
(-2.17) 
2.888*** 
(3.36) 
Prob Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
N 561 561 561 561  376 376 
Hausman Test 32.1  33.20   21.13  
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FIGURE 1 
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Appendix 1 
Examples for types of environmental disclosures 1-5 
 
 
 
  
Disclosure Type  Definition  Example  
0 No disclosure  
 
1 Pure narrative disclosure related to 
category definition  
“A responsible approach to the 
environment is embedded in BG 
group approach and standards” (BG 
Group Annual Report 2011) 
 
 
2 Pure narrative disclosure with 
more details  
“ the Group also responded to 
public concerns over Hydraulic 
factoring technology where the 
fluid is injected into rocks to allow 
gas to flow back to the surface” 
(BG Group Annual Report 2011) 
 
 
3 Quantitative disclosures 
addressing the issue with 
numerical information 
“In 2011,Emission from the group 
business emitted 7.5m tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent” (BG 
Group Annual Report 2011) 
  
4 Quantitative disclosures with 
narrative explanation  
“CO2e emission on an equity share 
basis, including operations where 
BG Group is an investor but not an 
operator, were 13% lower year on 
year by 10.6 mt CO2e” (BG Group 
Annual Report 2011) 
 
5 Quantitative disclosures including 
narrative statements demonstrating  
comparison  
“Cutting emission is central on BG 
Group’s climate change strategy, at 
the end of 2011, the Group was on 
track to meet its 2007 target of 
sustainable reduction in greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission by 1 million 
tonnes by 2012( the group has 
achieved a sustainable GHG 
reduction of 985000 by Dec 2011) 
and BG Group achieved 221000 
tonnes sustainable annualized 
reduction” (BG Group Annual 
Report 2011) 
 
 
